




Colombian agricultural sector and armed conflict (2007 - 2022): An empirical analysis

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ABSTRACT

This article empirically proposes an unbalanced panel data model of random effects for the total of municipalities in Colombia in a period between 2007 and 2022 that analyzes the impact of the armed conflict on agricultural production, controlling by municipalities ZOMAC, post-peace agreement and sown area. The results show that production is negatively affected by 0.008% for each 1% additional victims of conflict in the municipalities each year; the analysis is carried out crop cycle, where transient crops are the most affected in the face of the conflict. On the other hand, the econometry model include the Differences-in-Differences parameter to estimate the post-agreements, between Colombian Estate and FARC, effect in the agriculture production. The results show that in a peace scenario, the agriculture production growth 0,07% each year.

KEYWORDS

Agricultural production, Armed conflict, Violence, Institutionalality

Setor agrícola colombiano e conflito armado (2007 - 2022): Uma análise empírica

RESUMO

Este artigo propõe empiricamente um modelo de dados de painel desequilibrado de efeitos aleatórios para o total de municípios da Colômbia em um período entre 2007 e 2022, que analisa o impacto do conflito armado sobre a produção agrícola, controlando por municípios ZOMAC, acordo pós-paz e área semeada. Os resultados mostram que a produção é afetada negativamente por 0,008% para cada 1% de vítimas adicionais de conflito nos municípios a cada ano; a análise é realizada ciclo de culturas, onde as culturas transitórias são os mais afetados em face do conflito. Por outro lado, o modelo econométrico inclui o parâmetro Differences-in-Differences para estimar o efeito pós-acordos, entre o Estado colombiano e as FARC, na produção agrícola. Os resultados mostram que, num cenário de paz, a produção agrícola cresce 0,07% ao ano.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Produção agrícola, Conflito armado, Violência, Institucionalidade

JEL CLASSIFICATION

D74, O18, E02

1. Introduction and Formulation of Problem

In Colombia there are as many conflicts as there are cultures and languages within its territory. It is impossible to see the economic, social, and political history of the nation without talking about violence, even mentioning that one of the periods of time in the development of the Republic was named "La Violencia" that had its beginnings between the years 1946-1958 and that is still in force. That same season, the first military front constituted by peasants who sought to protect and defend their territories from the threats arising from a political conflict between liberals and conservatives, better known as the National Front, emerged in the Colombian fields and mountains. This first rural/peasant military group was called the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC – EP), which emerged from the Colombian countryside, given the problems that peasants and ethnic communities have faced since the colony for the acquisition of land and capital (Rodríguez e Cepeda Cuervo, 2011). Although this conflict arose with a political intention, over time it permeated drug trafficking and landowners (Rodríguez e Cepeda Cuervo, 2011). Years later, in 1965, the National Liberation Army (ELN) began military training in San Vicente de Chucurí, in the department of Santander.

The conflict in Colombia has permeated all areas of society, including *culture* to the extent that the solution to problems between families and individuals is based on the use of weapons or threats without first remedying with an arbitrary actor; *the labor market* from the perspective of disparities in access to employment by the population victim of the conflict; *the agricultural and rural sector* is not far behind the list, largely interrupted by groups outside the law that abuse the use of weapons and charge small producers amounts of money in exchange for "security" or allow them to continue their agricultural activities, a situation that has led to the dispossession of their lands, recruitment of children and young people for war, and forced displacement, which, according to Segrelles Serrano (2020), has as its main causes the armed conflict, which was born as a result of the lack of opportunity to obtain land and capital.

The perception of insecurity has scared away foreign investment aimed at confirming industries in the nation, so that progress in the Colombian countryside has suffered a major backlog and setback, which as expressed by Sandoval e Martínez (2010, p. 146) like "the cessation of the conflict would generate that foreign direct investment would be further encouraged and would boost economic growth in the country, which will lead to greater productivity and better quality of life for Colombian society".

Thus, the conflict has not only occurred in a military sense, but in all social aspects

combining cultural, anthropological, economic, gender and other aspects, where the different ethnic groups (Afro-descendants, Raizales, Palenqueros, indigenous, peasants, blacks) are in tensions for land ownership, for social and democratic recognition, for access to a decent monetary income, always alluding to what the Magna Carta positions Colombia as a social state of right.

In addition, it is worth noting that, because of the problems of the rural sector in Colombia, there has been a transformation between the countryside and the city, where the countryside has been losing population and participation in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Segrelles Serrano, 2018). This has forged a development gap between the two where the countryside has narrowly precarious infrastructure, which has caused a strong exodus from the countryside to the city (Segrelles Serrano, 2018). Likewise, it is important to mention that, although from 2014 there was a decrease in the poverty index, this decrease continues to be greater than that of the city due to a revealing difference, where the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2018 for Colombia is 13.6 for municipal capitals and 39.9 for dispersed population and rural centers (DANE, 2019).

The unleashing of political crises, state abandonment, segregation and poor rural development practices have plunged the Colombian agricultural sector into situations of precariousness and violence. In this sense, this article seeks to analyze from a regional approach and from the perspective of Peace, Justice, and Solid Institutions¹, the impact that the expectations of peace in the period of negotiation between the State and the FARC-EP between 2013 and 2016 had on the agricultural sector.

The organization of the article consists of the present introduction (1), followed by a literature review on the role of institutions and rural development (2). It is followed by the methodology and description of the data (3), the econometric analysis of structural change and results (4). To conclude any scenarios of government intervention (5).

2. Institutionalality and Rural Development

From the perspective of neo-institutional economics, Douglas North (1986), as one of its main proponents, along with Ronald Coase (1937, 1998) as key contributors, emphasizes that institutions represent the rules of the game and the organizational structures that ensure the proper functioning of markets. A robust judicial system and well-established governmental capacity are essential to promote the effective enforcement of contracts and the implementation of laws (Coase, 1937).

What has been narrated in the paragraphs prior to this section of the article shows

¹Goal 16th of the Sustainable Development Goals

that in Colombia the lack of an institutionality that guarantees the rights and fulfillment of the duties of the population has been one of the main engines of low development for the rural population, it is they who have suffered violence, the study tables have become trenches for primary and secondary students in these sectors to protect themselves. of the state-guerrilla military confrontations, girls have been taken as sexual objects for these illegal armed groups, many boys were and still are being recruited to "render their service to the nation" with weapon in hand, a situation that has been described by various authors and institutions from the nineteenth century to the present (Reina Rodríguez, 2012; Cifuentes Patiño, 2015; Zorio, 2015; Bello Albarracín, 2002; Council, 2021; ACAPS, 2022).


On the other hand, this same school introduces one of the most important variables in economic development and conflict: *The temporal dimension*. We can analyze the conflict multiple facets, among them: intensity, location, socio-political characteristics, among others, but also its duration, it can then be said that economic growth and macroeconomic magnitudes are subject to the characteristics of the conflict factor. If the conflict is believed to be long-lasting and no early solution is contemplated, the pace of economic growth will begin to be adversely affected by investment decisions; accumulation of physical, social and human capital; political decisions that begin to deviate to the issues of war and not to the development of social welfare seen from justice, equality, etc. This is part of the institutionalist notion of the process of building social arrangements, which allows ordering power relations and the economy in a society. "When the conflict undermines the strength of the institutions resulting from these arrangements, the growth of the economy is weakened" (Martínez Ortiz, 2001, p. 163). In addition, the unleashing of Colombian conflicts has had to do, mainly, with the worsening of the agrarian crisis (Perry, 2000) and its magnitude has been such that until the end of the twentieth century these armed groups have come to cover two thirds of the country's municipalities (Sierra, 2019).

From a sociological point of view, Galtung (1998) highlights from the theory of social conflicts that visible violence (confrontations, displacements, murders, among others) is only the top of the iceberg, hiding a part that is much deeper. Galtung identifies three types of violence: direct, cultural, and structural (see Figure 1). Within this structural violence are aspects such as corruption, the search for a particular benefit, cultural and economic selfishness, denialism, poverty², abuses, institutional lack, among others. Cultural violence, for its part, involves two main aspects: first, the attitudes taken by the different ethnic groups towards the conflict, that is, the confrontations without dialogue that persist in the territories; and secondly, the discourse by the urban population and the government towards ethnic groups, that is,

²The aspect of poverty has a bidirectional sense, since the conflict leads to levels of monetary poverty, but at the same time a poverty seen from what Amartya Sen exposed as the limitations of resolution to difficult circumstances, leads to conflicts and violence. (Ferullo, 2006).

they are often treated as the minority implying racism and unjustified classism, implicit in the development of public policies implemented without involving the target population of intervention in their approach.

Figure 1. Galtung Pyramid of Violence.



Source: Galtung (1998)

In addressing cultural violence, the insights of Ellis e Biggs (2001) and Ashley e Maxwell (2001) are particularly relevant. They propose rethinking intervention strategies through the concept of sustainable livelihoods, which shifts away from top-down governance. This approach views rural development as a participatory process, empowering rural communities to take control of their own lands from the bottom up. The framework focuses on asset vulnerability, aiming to identify factors that make rural families susceptible to impacts and to guide policies that enhance their resilience to disasters.

Among the empirical studies addressing the impact of conflict on society, Galdo (2013) explores the consequences of early exposure to armed conflict on the future labor outcomes of children aged 1 to 3 in Peru. Experiencing conflict from a young age affects children's mental and physical health, hindering the development of cognitive skills. These setbacks can disrupt academic progress, ultimately reducing their chances of securing formal employment or positions in large companies.

Using an econometric panel data model that examined Peruvian districts with varying levels of violence before and after the emergence of an armed group, the study found that Peru lost US\$9 billion (equivalent to 66% of its external debt and 45% of

GDP in 1989). Children exposed to conflict experienced, on average, a 5% reduction in earnings, a 6% lower probability of working in large companies, and a 3.5% decrease in accessing formal jobs. Women faced greater wage deterioration than men, and the negative effects were more pronounced in urban areas than in rural ones.

This armed conflict in Peru lasted 20 years and, according to the evidence, the results in those children from districts with greater violence were greater poverty, social inequality, low educational level and, therefore, low access to high-class jobs. In Colombia, 6 decades of armed confrontations have been overcome, causing millions of families ³ victims of terrorism because of institutional disarticulation.

Among the studies carried out exclusively for the agricultural sector is a degree work carried out by Jasso Barrón (2021) for Mexico which, based on an econometric model of fixed effects for panel data, concludes that the impact of the homicide rate has a negative effect on agricultural GDP for 20 municipalities with the highest agricultural value in Mexico.

In Colombia are the Libroseller Ruiz (2015), estimating a panel data model with pooled data method for 807 municipalities from 2000 to 2014 where it is concluded that the armed conflict in Colombia negatively affects both the agricultural production of the municipalities and the number of planted agricultural hectares. For Arias e Ibáñez (2012), their conclusion does not differ in the negative effect of the conflict adding to the analysis the variable of the crop cycle, concluding that violence assigns 19.3 percentage points (p.p) less to permanent crops, 13.7 p.p more to transitory and 14.6 p.p more to pastures. Last but not least, the one presented by Ferrer Vargas (2021) and Sierra Ariza et al. (2022) who also carried out an econometric process of fixed effects for all municipalities between 2011 and 2016 reinforcing, from the forced displacement variable, the results of negative effects mainly on family units and these effects are amplified in the presence of illegal markets.

The Peace Agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC represents a historic milestone in the quest for peace and reconciliation in a nation marked by more than five decades of armed conflict. Signed on November 24, 2016, the agreement resulted from intense negotiations held in Havana, Cuba, over nearly four years. This treaty addressed multiple dimensions of the conflict, aiming to demobilize combatants, integrate ex-guerrillas into civil and political life, and promote socio-economic development in rural areas affected by violence, known as Areas of Highest Conflict (ZOMAC, by its acronym in Spanish).

³According to the Single Victims Registry (RUV) to 2023 there are 9.446,572 persons recognized as victims of the armed conflict.

The agreement was structured around six main points. First, a Comprehensive Rural Reform to improve living conditions in the countryside and reduce agrarian inequalities. Second, the political participation of ex-combatants, ensuring their inclusion in the democratic system. Third, the end of the conflict, which involved a bilateral ceasefire, disarmament, and the reintegration of FARC members. Fourth, the solution to the problem of illicit drugs, with crop substitution programs and efforts against drug trafficking. Fifth, a transitional justice system for victims, including the creation of a Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP by its acronym in Spanish). Finally, mechanisms for implementation, verification, and ratification to ensure the agreements were effectively fulfilled.

Despite its noble objectives and the hope, it generated, the Peace Agreement has faced numerous criticisms from various sectors of Colombian society. One prominent criticism is the perception of impunity. Many Colombians believe that the agreement allows those responsible for serious crimes, such as kidnappings, murders, and rapes, to avoid prison sentences by participating in the transitional justice system. This approach is seen as too lenient and has generated discontent among conflict victims and their families.

Another area of criticism focuses on the reincorporation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Programs designed to facilitate this transition have been considered inadequate. Ex-guerrillas have reported a lack of economic, social, and educational support, leading some to relapse into criminal activities or join dissident groups. The perception that the government has not fully delivered on its promises has eroded trust in the peace process.

Security in rural areas has also been a concern. Despite the agreement, many social leaders and human rights defenders have been murdered, highlighting the continued influence of armed groups and paramilitary structures in these areas. The lack of effective protection and the persistence of drug trafficking have complicated the consolidation of peace in regions historically affected by the conflict.

Additionally, the crop substitution programs for illicit crops have been criticized for poor implementation. Farmers who eradicated coca crops have not received the promised support to develop viable economic alternatives, leading to discontent and, in some cases, replanting illicit crops. This situation reflects the need for a more comprehensive and sustained intervention to resolve the drug trafficking problem.

Political polarization in Colombia has exacerbated these criticisms. Political parties and leaders, such as former President Álvaro Uribe and his Democratic Center

party, have used the agreement as a divisive issue, arguing that it harms victims and unduly benefits ex-combatants. This polarization has hindered the complete and effective implementation of the agreement, fostering a climate of distrust and opposition.

Although the agreement aims to address the structural causes of the conflict, such as inequality and rural poverty, many critics argue that insufficient progress has been made in these areas. The lack of investment in infrastructure, education, and basic services in the areas most affected by the conflict remains a significant challenge. The implementation of the agreement is an ongoing process that requires constant adjustments and renewed commitment to address the concerns of all sectors of Colombian society.


3. Methodology and description of data

The methodological procedure used to analyze and fulfill the objective of the research on the impact that the armed conflict has had on Colombian agricultural production will be in accordance with an unbalanced panel data ⁴ model for the total of municipalities in Colombia within the period 2006 – 2022, taking into consideration some relevant aspects that allow arriving at an impact indicator without confusion bias, as are the post-agreement signed between the State and the FARC, sown area and the ZOMAC municipalities.

The agricultural production data are obtained from the Municipal Agricultural Evaluations (EVA, by its acronym in Spanish) published by the Rural Agricultural Planning Unit (UPRA) for the same period described above, from this data source the variables of sown area measured in hectares and Production in tons per municipality are obtained. For conflict data, the number of people who report being victims (*PER_{OCU}*) at the municipal level is obtained from the Single Registry of Victims (RUV). In total, the study is carried out for 1,119⁵ municipalities that will be divided, into those that are ZOMAC registered in agreement 1650 of 2017, according to this agreement there are a total of 344 municipalities distributed by departments as illustrated in the following map (see Figure 2).

⁴An unbalanced data panel implies that information lost for some individual or temporal observations. For estimation, Fixed or Random Effects are the best techniques. According to tests like Breusch-Pagan and Hausman, OLS is not recommended.

⁵In Colombia, there are 1,121 municipalities, but San Andrés and Providencia are excluded due to their distinct agricultural characteristics and conflict-related differences.

Figure 2. ZOMAC municipalities distribution map. Colombia, 2017.

Source: Authors' elaboration, based on Agreement 1650 of 2017. National Government of Colombia.


Analyzing the temporal heterogeneity⁶ by municipality for the values of production (Figure 3), sown area (Figure 4) and for the number of victims (Figure 5), it is found that production had a growing evolution since 2012 (year in which negotiations begin) after a period of more notorious variations, in 2018 there is a first negative variation, however in 2019 there is a jump in production that according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 2019 applies a policy of insurance and risk prevention, Agricultural Insurance and increase of subsidy per hectare cultivated. As

⁶The panel databases integrate the analysis of temporal heterogeneity as the average and standard deviation of the individual/establishment in each period. The standard deviation is represented by the blue lines in the graphs.

for the sown area, there is an increasing trend over time with fluctuations between 2014 and 2018.


Finally, the number of victims has been showing a decrease from 2007 to 2016 -the year in which the peace agreements are signed- however from this year, there is an increasing trend in the number of victims. The behavior in this variable was related to the inapplicability of the pacification policy in the years following the signing of the peace agreement. Given the uncertainty generated by the poor governance of the state in the face of the demobilized FARC, dissidents and other illegal groups emerged in the municipalities, including 'La Nueva Marquetalia', 'Estado Mayor Central', 'Frente Óliver Sinisterra' and 70 other military fronts.

Figure 3. Temporal heterogeneity in production. Municipalities from Colombia, 2007 – 2022.




Source: Authors' elaboration

Figure 4. Temporal heterogeneity in the sown area. Municipalities from Colombia, 2007 – 2022.



Source: Authors' elaboration

Figure 5. Temporal heterogeneity in the number of victims due to armed conflict. Municipalities from Colombia, 2007 – 2022



Source: Authors' elaboration

In contrast to the above, a previous conclusion can be reached of a negative relationship between the variables of agriculture and conflict, so that for the period of a lower number of average annual victims, there is an increase in production and average sown areas per year.

One of the observations in this study has to do with the productive differences between those municipalities that are part of the ZOMAC and those that are not, so the average for each of these subgroups presented in the following table shows that on average per municipality and per year in ZOMAC areas, the victims reach 613 people, On the other hand, for the other municipalities this figure reaches 278 on average.

Table 1. Average value per variable and ZOMAC classification. Municipalities from Colombia, 2007 – 2022

Variables	Total, Municipalities	ZOMAC Municipalities	Non-ZOMAC Municipalities
Production (Ton.)	49,279.93	47,463.74	50,109.53
Sown Area (Ha.)	4,601.33	6,189.27	3,875.99
Occurrence of Victims	277.96	613.01	277.96

Source: Authors' elaboration

The number of tons produced is higher in non-ZOMAC areas by about 3 tons compared to those that are not part of conflict regions; the production obtained in ZOMAC municipalities is achieved with several sown hectares that narrowly double those registered for the other municipalities. This empirical evidence shows a situation of significant differences between the two areas, so that a preliminary interpretation of this finding suggests that the productive yields of the different crops (production in tons for each planted hectare) is much lower for those municipalities that have suffered the conflict.

4. Modeling and Results

For the modeling of these variables, we have an unbalanced data panel for 1,119 municipalities in Colombia represented in the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Production_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 PerOcc_{i,t} + \beta_2 SownArea_{i,t} + \beta_3 Zomac \\
 & + \beta_4 PeaceAgreements + \delta_1 Zomac_Agreements + \alpha_i + u_{i,t}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

where,

- $Production_{i,t}$: It will be the variable associated with agricultural production (ton) in the period t for the municipality i .
- $PerOcc_{i,t}$: Armed conflict variable, number of victims for each municipality in the period t .
- $SownArea_{i,t}$: number of hectares sown with agricultural crops in each municipality and time period.

- *Zomac*: as a dichotomic variable, it will take the value of 1 for those municipalities that are part of this category.
- *PeaceAgreements*: it will take the value of 1 from the 2016 period and 0 otherwise.
- *Zomac_Agreements*: captures the zomac and peace agreements interaction.
- β_0 : intercept of the model
- β_1 : slope coefficient to armed conflict variable. It captures the variation of production when number of victims change in one person.
- β_2 : slope coefficient for the sown hectares/area variable, capturing the change in production resulting from a one-unit increase in hectares.
- β_3 : average change in the production for municipalities experiencing armed conflict.
- β_4 : average change in the production for municipalities experiencing peace agreements.
- δ_1 : captures the causality effect through difference in difference (DID) methodology.
- α_i : represents unobservable individual heterogeneity between municipalities.
- $u_{i,t}$: Random term of idiosyncratic error

After the corresponding tests for significant effects at individual and temporal level by Breusch-Pagan method and given that pooling data does not capture individual heterogeneity reaching an estimate with inconsistent and biased parameters, the results of the model are presented by random effects (fixed effects are discarded by Hausman test):

Table 2. Regression Results

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	9.415*** (0.044)	9.264*** (0.052)	9.117*** (0.052)	1.401*** (0.074)
Ln_PerOcup	-0.026*** (0.002)	-0.026*** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Ln_SownArea				1.028*** (0.009)
Peace_Agreements			0.373*** (0.013)	0.358*** (0.010)
Zomac		0.489*** (0.094)	0.344*** (0.094)	-0.303*** (0.051)
Zomac:Peace_Agreements				0.116*** (0.020) 0.073*** (0.016)
Observations	15,997	15,997	15,997	15,997
R^2	0.025	0.025	0.112	0.500

Source: Authors' elaboration

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 2 shows four models. The first one is the naive model where the conflict variable is significant and negative. From this first model, the variables of the model are included one by one, until the complete model is reached (Model 4). This procedure is carried out with the intention of showing consistency or persistence in the behavior of the target variable. However, the R^2 changes for each model, the latter being the most consistent (0.5).

With these results then, first, there is sufficient statistical evidence not to reject the null hypothesis of a negative relationship between the variable of armed conflict and the agricultural sector represented in the production in tons per year and for each municipality. Second, if the number of victims grows by 1%, production will decrease in 0.008% on average; On the other hand, the parameter that captures the ZOMAC and peace agreements interaction (δ_1) is positive and significant. This means that, given that it captures a causal effect -differences in differences-, the peace agreements have had a direct effect on the growth of agricultural production in the ZOMAC municipalities.

Another important result occurs when modeling is done by crop cycle (Table 3), the results point to a greater negative effect towards transient crops, which is verified by the findings of the research of Arias e Ibáñez (2012). This study highlights the statistical significance towards this type of crops, which concludes that its production will tend to fall by 0.017% (0.011% for permanent crops) on average as the number of victims of conflict increases in 1% in the municipalities.

Table 3. Regression Results: Transient and Permanent Models

Variables	Transient	Permanent
Constant	1.001*** (0.044)	6.629*** (0.113)
Ln_PerOcup	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.004)
Ln_SownArea	1.055*** (0.006)	0.118*** (0.013)
Peace_Agreements	0.281*** (0.013)	0.493*** (0.027)
Zomac	-0.499*** (0.054)	0.489*** (0.094)
Zomac:Peace_Agreements	0.107*** (0.022)	0.177*** (0.043)
Observations	16,715	15,116
R^2	0.627	0.035

Source: Authors' elaboration

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Now, the parameter that measures the causality of the peace agreements on agricultural production for each crop shows higher growth in permanent ones (0,177%), while transient crops grew by 0,107% due to the peace agreements. Even, the model for transient crops has a better R^2 than for permanent crops.

5. Conclusions

The end of the internal armed conflict in Colombia and of any type of violence (visible and invisible) would mean public spending in sectors neglected by the State, in incentives for agricultural investment, promoting agribusiness, but above all a society far from violence; it is required, therefore, following the neo-institutional line of North (1986) and Coase (1937) in addition to the history of the conflict in Colombia, a justice reform is required that guarantees institutional compliance and a clear rules of the game at the State level for the proper functioning of the public, private and civil society sectors in order not to continue extending the temporality of the conflict and, above all, to change the current dynamics of the agricultural economic sector so that the countryside/rural sector transitions to a scenario of peace and cessation of conflict, thus complying with international approaches such as goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Peace Agreement signed on November 24th/2016, is a unique platform for the Integral Rural Reform (RRI, by its acronym in Spanish) to address the development gap between the countryside and the city, giving peasant families victims of the conflict and those already present in the countryside, the opportunity to access the necessary land together with capital and knowledge to develop sustainable productive projects over time. which is essential for the preservation of the Peace Agreement. Likewise, it is worth noting that RRI is a debt of a century of the Colombian State with the rural population (peasants and ethnic groups). Likewise, the RRI is an important opportunity for agrarian reform and peace negotiations, that is, the end of the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian State, which has been one of the main causes of the current state of the rural structure in the country.

Colombia, being a country with an agricultural vocation, the end of the conflict in its entirety would strengthen the agricultural sector since there is a negative relationship between both sectors. Thus, although this article was developed with characteristics of direct violence, it is recommended for future studies to consider the invisible violence proposed by Galtung (1998) that integrate conflicts of both a cultural nature and negotiations of needs, to determine structural changes in Colombian agricultural practices.

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